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NAVIGATING THROUGH THE CONFUSION LEFT IN THE
WAKE OF RAPANOS: WHY A RULE CLARIFYING AND
BROADENING JURISDICTION UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT IS NECESSARY
KRISTEN CLARK*
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary version of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) was
enacted through the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948, with the intent “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”1 In addition, the Clean Water Act has the ambitious goal that all waters in the
United States be “fishable” and “swimmable.”2 With the 1972 amendments, Congress shifted away from state enforcement of water quality
regulation and gave the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and
Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) permitting authority under
section 402 and section 404 of the CWA.3
Wetlands have only recently been recognized as a valuable natural
resource.4 In the past, it was common practice for wetlands to be drained
and filled.5 Now, section 404 of the CWA requires dischargers to obtain
a permit from the Army Corps before discharging dredged or fill material
into a wetland.6 Wetlands encompass “swamps, marshes, bogs, bottom
*
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1
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE
CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 11 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011). The specific provisions
of the CWA establish water quality standards which serve as a benchmark for regulatory
and non-regulatory programs to achieve that primary objective.
2
Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lcwa.html
(last updated Aug. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WRW7-M7GK.
3
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION 27 (2d ed. 2009).
4
LINDA A. MALONE & WILLIAM M. TABB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 708
(2d ed. 2011).
5
Id.
6
40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2013); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 271 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that dredged material means material that
is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States. Fill materials mean any
“pollutant” which replaces portions of the “waters of the United States” with dry land or
which changes the bottom of a water body for a purpose).
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lands, and tundra.”7 The discharge of dredged material is defined as “any
addition of dredged material into, including redeposit of dredged material
other than incidental fallback within the waters of the United States.”8
The discharge of fill material is “the addition of fill material into waters of
the United States.”9
Section 404 is not a statute that was designed with the purpose to
preserve wetlands10 and it has become highly contentious over the past
decade.11 Section 404 applies only to “navigable waters,” defined by the
CWA as all “waters of the United States including the territorial seas.”12
Understanding what falls within this term is crucial because discharges
to water bodies that fall under the term “water[s] of the United States” “will
require a permit under the CWA.”13 Landowners favor a limited scope of
jurisdiction for EPA and the Army Corps, and they argue that section 404
does not apply to non-navigable wetlands.14 Environmentalists and government regulators, on the other hand, want a broad interpretation of the
scope of section 404.15
For a while, EPA used a broad interpretation of the scope of its
authority, and courts and other actors gave deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute.16 However, in the early 2000s, that changed with a
series of Supreme Court cases culminating in Rapanos v. United States.17
In Rapanos, the court split 4–1–4 with no opinion gaining a majority.18 Multiple tests emerged from the case, and the limitations on EPA and Army
Corps are unclear.19 In the plurality opinion, a “relatively permanent” test
emerged which requires a determination of whether there is a “relatively
permanent flow” of water and a “continuous surface connection” between
the wetland and the drainage ditches.20

7

MALONE & TABB, supra note 4, at 708.
40 C.F.R § 232.2.
9
Id.
10
MALONE & TABB, supra note 4, at 708.
11
SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 271.
12
Id.
13
SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., supra note 1, at 11.
14
SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 271.
15
Id.
16
Stephen M. Johnson, The Rulemaking Response to Rapanos, in THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT 22, 22 (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007).
17
Id. at 22–23.
18
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 718 (2006).
19
See, e.g., id.
20
Id. at 732–33.
8
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion established a “significant nexus”21 test
whereby wetlands are covered by the statute if they significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters.22
This test imposes a significant burden on EPA and Army Corps because in
order to establish a “significant nexus,” they would have “to ‘establish . . .
on a case-by-case basis’ that wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries
‘significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered waters more readily understood as “navigable.” ’ ”23
Both of these tests are narrower in scope than EPA’s broader
interpretation. Circuit courts disagree over which test applies, and the
Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari on cases which would clarify the
issue.24 Legislative efforts to address the issue, such as the Clean Water
Restoration Act of 2009, have failed.25 The confusion over which test
should apply, as well as the lengthy case-by-case determinations required
through the Kennedy opinion, have led to a decrease in agency efficiency
and general enforcement.26 As a result of Supreme Court cases and subsequent guidance, there are many waters that are now left unprotected.27
In the past, in an attempt to clear up the uncertainty, EPA and
Army Corps have attempted rulemaking and issued guidance. In 2003,
Army Corps and EPA announced that they were going to go through the
rulemaking process.28 They abandoned the effort by the end of the same
year.29 After two attempts (2008 and 2011), guidance has also proven to
be insufficient to address the problems left in the wake of Rapanos.
Industry officials and landowners are confused as to when a permit is
necessary, and cases continue to be litigated on the issue. A change
through the rulemaking process is necessary and beneficial, and will
21

Id. at 759.
Id. at 780.
23
Id. at 753.
24
MALONE & TABB, supra note 4, at 743; Sean McLernon, Clean Water Act Inconsistency
Lingers Long After Rapanos, LAW 360 (July 11, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.law360.com
/articles/456546/clean-water-act-inconsistency-lingers-long-after-rapanos, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZXW8-E5GJ.
25
Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787, 111th Cong. (2009).
26
Jennifer L. Baader, Permits for Puddles?: The Constitutionality and Necessity of
Proposed Agency Guidance Clarifying Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
621, 622 (2013).
27
Overview: Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009, CLEAN WATER ACTION, http://www
.cleanwateraction.org/mediakit/overview-clean-water-restoration-act-2009 (last visited
Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WJU2-NYTJ.
28
See MALONE & TABB, supra note 4, at 723.
29
See id.
22
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finally clear up the issue of what constitutes a “navigable water” under
the CWA.
In the rulemaking process, EPA relies on a scientific report as the
basis for its draft rule.30 Based on the findings in the scientific report, EPA
has an opportunity to expand its jurisdiction to more closely resemble its
original boundaries through the rulemaking process. Although the rulemaking process is time consuming, EPA needs a rule now because the
confusion has lasted long enough, the Supreme Court has suggested that
it will give Chevron deference to a rule, and the rule can re-establish broad
jurisdiction while staying within the lawful confines of the CWA.
Because much of the confusion is a result of case and legislative
history, Part I of this Note will discuss the history of the CWA, the case
history surrounding the “navigable waters” confusion, and the current
state of confusion. Part II will discuss EPA’s opportunity to use scientific
research to construct a broader scope of jurisdiction through the rulemaking process. Finally, Part III will discuss the benefits and detriments
of adopting a rule and show (1) that it does not unlawfully expand CWA
jurisdiction, (2) it is a necessary step towards protecting our nation’s
waters, and (3) it is important for a rule to be approved now.
I.

PART I

A.

History of the CWA

The contemporary CWA has its origins in the 1899 Rivers and
Harbors Act and the FWPCA.31 While the primary purpose of the Rivers
and Harbors Act was to “ensure the free and open navigability of U.S.
waters,” it prohibited some discharges into navigable waters of the United
States, making it an early tool against water pollution.32 As industrialization increased, pollution received greater attention and the FWPCA
was passed with the goal of protecting the nation’s waters from chemical
pollution.33 In 1972, the FWPCA was amended with the intention to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
30

Documents Related to the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the
Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/uswaters/documents
-related-proposed-definition-waters-united-states-under-clean-water-act (last updated
Sept. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/A4Y2-QKJF.
31
JOEL M. GROSS & KERRI L. STELCEN, CLEAN WATER ACT 5 (2d ed. 2012).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 6.
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the Nation’s waters.”34 When the amendments were enacted, the Act became known as the CWA, and it is the current federal law governing water
pollution in the United States.35
Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits unpermitted discharges of
pollutants from point sources into “navigable waters.”36 To accomplish its
goals, the CWA established two permitting methods. The first is the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), established under section 402, which applies to all point source dischargers of
all pollutants,37 except “dredged and fill material.” Point source dischargers
of dredge and fill material fall under the permit program established
under section 404.38 The EPA administers the NPDES, and EPA and Army
Corps jointly administer the section 404 permit program.39 One of the goals
of the 1972 amendments was to “repudiate limits that had been placed
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes. . . .”40 As
a result of the amendments, for almost three decades there was broad
federal jurisdiction over national waters.
Historically, Congress thought its power to regulate the nation’s
waters derived from the federal government’s powers under the United
States Constitution’s Commerce Clause.41 Because the Commerce Clause
allows Congress to regulate commerce among the states, Congress believed
that its power under the Commerce Clause was limited to navigable waterways. Therefore, when Congressional water legislation was passed, such
as section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, it only asserted authority over
“navigable waters.”42 For this reason, when Congress drafted section 404
of the CWA, it used the same language. However, in order to broaden the
34

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 31, at 7.
36
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
37
Douglas R. Williams, The Next Generation of Environmental and Natural Resources
Law: What Has Changed in Forty Years and What Needs to Change as a Result: Toward
Regional Governance in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047, 1064 (2013) (citing
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
EPA lacks “authority to exempt categories of point sources from the permit requirements
of § 402)).
38
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1987). See also OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER’S GUIDE 335 (2011).
39
See CRAIG, supra note 3, at 27. See also Section 404 Permitting, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis (last updated Mar. 13, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/6LQX-55YH.
40
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
41
Baader, supra note 26, at 622.
42
SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 272.
35
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jurisdiction of the CWA, Congress defined the term “navigable waters”
to mean “waters of the United States.”43
The CWA’s legislative history supports the belief that Congress
intended to make “the waters of the United States” encompass more waters
than those traditionally thought of as navigable under prior programs such
as the Rivers and Harbors Act.44 According to the House report:
One term the Committee was reluctant to define was
the term “navigable waters.” The reluctance was based
on the fear that any interpretation would be read too
narrowly. . . . “[t]he Committee fully intends that the
term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation, unencumbered by agency
determinations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes.”45
Congress’s description of federal jurisdiction left room for interpretation and further development. Initially, Army Corps did not take
advantage of its ability to take a broad view of its jurisdiction under the
CWA. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, environmental
groups successfully challenged the position of Army Corps on CWA jurisdiction under section 404.46 Army Corps took the narrow view that
navigable waters only extended to “actually, potentially, or historically
navigable waterways, which include few wetlands and virtually no freshwater wetlands.”47 Siding with the environmental groups, the district
court concluded that Congress intended for CWA jurisdiction to go as far
as its commerce powers permitted.48
The CWA gives EPA and Army Corps authority to define the term
“waters of the United States.”49 Army Corps and EPA developed federal
43

Id.
SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., supra note 1, at 12.
45
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972), reprinted in ENVTL. POLICY DIV., LIBRARY
OF CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972, at 818 (1973)).
46
SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 272.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 5, available at http://op
.bna.com/itr.nsf/id/rran-9d8qx7/$File/WOTUS%20scan.pdf (draft of proposed rule); see
also Leaked Draft of Water Jurisdiction Rule May Not Be Final EPA Position, Vilsack Says,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.bna.com/leaked-draft-water-n17179881420/,
44
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regulations (last codified in 1986), which define the term “waters of the
United States” as:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in
the past, or may be susceptible to use in foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to ebb and flow of
the tide;
(2) All interstate waters, including wetlands;
(3) All “other waters” such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce . . .
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters
of the United States under this definition;
(5) Tributaries of the waters identified in (1) through (4);
(6) The territorial seas; and
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that
are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (1)
through (6).50
In the past, courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
gave deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute when deciding cases
that addressed CWA jurisdiction. In United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed whether section 404 applies to
wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waterways but are not themselves
navigable.51 In its decision, the Court demonstrated Chevron deference,
a standard which requires a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of
a statute when the statute in question is ambiguous, where enforcement
of such statute has been delegated to the agency, and where the agency’s
interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

archived at http://perma.cc/BLN4-LQXF (indicating that the draft rule does not necessarily
reflect the final position of the EPA).
50
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2013) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. (2013) (EPA regulations). EPA defines “wetlands” as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalance of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
51
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 123.
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statute.”52 The Court stated that adjacent wetlands are “inseparably
bound up” with the waters that they border and upheld the Corps’s inclusion of adjacent wetlands in its definition of “waters of the United
States.”53 In reaching its decision, the Court stated that Congress acknowledged that in order to meet the broad objectives of the CWA, broad
federal authority to control pollution would be needed because “[w]ater
moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants
be controlled at the source.”54
B.

Recent Supreme Court Cases Limiting the Scope of
CWA Jurisdiction

Much of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of
“navigable waters” is a result of Supreme Court decisions issued over the
past decade in which the Court started to limit the breadth of the waters
covered by the CWA. In the 1970s, when the CWA emerged in its current
form, Congress had a successful track record of regulating aspects of
society through its power over interstate commerce.55 The Supreme Court
frequently dismissed challenges to laws that have the Commerce Clause
as their foundation.56 Therefore, there was little incentive to defend the
commerce rationale behind the major environmental laws and the
Supreme Court upheld national environmental laws against attack.57
However, in a recent trend, the Court has been limiting Congress’s
power to regulate activities under the Commerce Clause. Recently, the
Supreme Court has decided several cases which have chipped away at
federal jurisdiction over national waterways. In United States v. Lopez,
the Court ruled that regulation under the Commerce Clause is constitutional only when the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce.58 This decision led to a number of challenges to existing
federal statutes, including the CWA.59
52
Id. (“An agency’s construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress.”);
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
53
See Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 134.
54
Id.
55
Bruce Myers & Jay Austin, The Commerce Clause: Foundation for U.S. Environmental
Law, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 37, 38 (James R. May ed.,
2011).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
59
Myers & Austin, supra note 55, at 38.
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Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”)60 is the first of two cases which limited
the prior broad federal jurisdiction under the CWA. Army Corps attempted
to regulate isolated ponds at a proposed solid waste site because of the
presence of migratory birds and the premise that birds generate interstate tourism business.61 In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the socalled “Migratory Bird Rule” exceeded the authority of Army Corps under
section 404 of the CWA.62 The Court clarified that in the Riverside case,
“it was the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’
that informed [the Court’s] reading of the CWA.”63 The isolated ponds
that had formed at the proposed waste site lacked the significant nexus.64
Following the decision in SWANCC, regulators focused their attention on
alternative bases for asserting jurisdiction under Army Corps’s isolated
waters jurisdiction—such as the existence of “adjacent wetlands.”65
2.

Rapanos v. United States

The second Supreme Court case to limit the scope of CWA protection for wetlands was Rapanos v. United States.66 This case furthered
the debate concerning what constitutes “adjacent wetlands.”67 Army Corps
attempted to assert jurisdiction over a wetland adjacent to a tributary
which ultimately flowed into a navigable water.68 This case went before
the Court five years after SWANCC, and it resulted in a 4–1–4 split decision, with no individual opinion commanding the majority of the court.69
Based on the Court’s historical use of Chevron deference, the case seemed

60

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,
174 (2001); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
61
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165; GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 31, at 84.
62
SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., supra note 1, at 2; see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165.
63
SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., supra note 1, at 2.
64
Id.
65
ROBERT MELTZ & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33263, THE WETLANDS
COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA): RAPANOS AND BEYOND, 6 (2013), available at
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33263.pdf.
66
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
67
MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 65, at 7.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 8.
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to warrant deference because it involved agencies’ long-standing regulatory interpretations of an ambiguous statute on issues that required
the agencies’ scientific expertise.70
However, in its decision the Court abandoned its use of agency
deference.71 The Court’s plurality opinion was unwilling to accord Chevron
deference to the government’s interpretation of the “Migratory Bird Rule”
because the regulation interfered with the state’s “traditional and primary
power over land and water use” and “where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”72 Kennedy’s concurring opinion ignores the Chevron framework altogether.73 The dissent
concluded “that either the statute clearly authorized the agencies’ regulation of the wetlands at issue or the statute was at least ambiguous, so
that the Court should defer to the agencies’ reasonable interpretation at
Chevron step two.”74
The Court’s refusal to grant Chevron deference could be viewed
as another step in the Court’s general erosion of Chevron deference.75
This would have important implications for agencies as they take steps
to respond to the Rapanos opinions.76 There are indications, however,
that the refusal of the Court to grant deference in Rapanos was a reaction to the agencies’ failure to amend the regulations to be consistent
with the Court’s SWANCC decision.77 Chief Justice Roberts criticized the

70

Johnson, supra note 16, at 23.
See id.; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., supra note 1, at 3.
72
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173–74.
73
Johnson, supra note 16, at 23.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 24. The Supreme Court has issued several opinions that could be viewed as
limiting the situations in which agencies’ interpretations of federal statutes receive Chevron
deference. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268 (2006) (holding “[s]ince the
Interpretive Rule was not promulgated pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority, its
interpretation of ‘legitimate medical purpose’ does not receive Chevron deference”); Food
& Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that
“agencies are generally entitled to deference in the interpretation of statutes that they
administer but a reviewing court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000)
(holding an “agency’s interpretation of statute which is contained in opinion letter, policy
statements, agency manuals, or enforcement guidelines, all of which lack force of law, do
not warrant Chevron-style deference”).
76
Johnson, supra note 16, at 24.
77
Id.
71
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agencies for failing to amend their regulations and said that if the regulatory definition had been amended after SWANCC, the interpretation
would have received “generous” deference under Chevron since the statute
clearly delegated authority to the agency to define the scope of waters of
the United States.78 Supreme Court cases decided post-Rapanos indicate
that agencies’ interpretations of statutes will receive Chevron deference
“when the statutes that the agencies are interpreting are ambiguous and
the agencies have been delegated authority to issue interpretations of
those statutes that have the force of law.”79
Two different tests emerged from the Rapanos case. Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion stated a “relatively permanent test”: “waters of
the United States” can be expanded beyond navigable waters to include
“relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.”80 The test
has two steps: first, an agency should determine if the water has a relatively permanent flow (which includes “seasonal rivers”) or whether it
exists for no longer than a day.81 Second, the agency should determine
whether there is a continuous surface connection between the wetland
and other waters of the United States that are protected by the CWA.82
If the continuous surface connection does not exist, then the wetland is
not protected by the CWA.83
The second test that emerged from Rapanos in Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion is the “significant nexus” test. This test concluded that
wetlands are covered by the CWA if they “possess a ‘significant nexus’ to
waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so
made.”84 Wetlands fall within the “significant nexus” test if they “either
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,

78

Id. at 34.
Id. See also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 535 U.S. 467 (2002);
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2000) (holding 1990 amendments to
Clean Air Act regarding ozone in nonattainment areas were ambiguous as to long-term
applicability which requires deference to EPA’s reasonable interpretation).
80
Brent Carson et al., Draft Rulemaking Likely to Expand Clean Water Act Jurisdiction,
VAN NESS FELDMAN LLP (Sep. 19, 2013), http://www.vnf.com/1101, archived at http://
perma.cc/UDL6-8LSB.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See id.; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., supra note 1, at 3.
84
SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY & RES., supra note 1, at 3; see SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION,
supra note 49; see also Leaked Draft of Water Jurisdiction Rule May Not Be Final EPA
Position, Vilsack Says, supra note 49 (indicating that the draft rule does not necessarily
reflect the final position of EPA).
79
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significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ”85
C.

Current State of Confusion

1.

Lower Court Confusion

Since the Rapanos ruling, the government has decided that a definition that meets either of the Rapanos tests is sufficient, but EPA is still
struggling to establish federal jurisdiction over some wetlands. Chief
Justice John Roberts stated, “It is unfortunate that no opinion commands
the majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress’s limits on
the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and regulated entities
will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”86 This prediction
means circuit courts face an unclear path forward and are applying different tests.87 Typically, courts apply the test of Marks v. United States,
that “when a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ ”88
The Rapanos ruling has been interpreted, applied, or cited in at
least ninety cases in thirty-five states.89 Once the court picks a test, it then
has to decide how to interpret what Scalia or Kennedy said, and courts
vary in this second interpretation as well. At least nine of the thirteen
federal circuits have ruled on cases interpreting Rapanos, with varying
results.90 Two circuits decided to apply the Kennedy “significant nexus”
test; two applied the Kennedy test but left available the option of applying
the plurality test in the future; three circuits followed Justice Stevens’s suggestion that a wetland meeting either test falls within the scope of CWA
85
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jurisdiction; and two circuits avoided the issue of which test to apply by
holding that the wetland at issue in the case met the criteria of both tests.91
The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits decided that a water is protected if it meets either of the tests.92 The First Circuit declined to apply
the Marks test to the opinions in Rapanos because “[t]he cases in which
Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction are not a subset of the
cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction.”93 According to the
court, “Marks is workable—one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as
‘narrower’ than another only when one opinion is a logical subset of other,
broader opinions.”94 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test is controlling but left open the possibility
of using the plurality test.95 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits did not choose a
controlling standard because the waters at issue satisfied both tests.96 So
far, no circuit court has held that only the plurality standard applies.97
In addition to the confusion in the circuit courts, at least one lower
court judge, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert Propst, has verbalized his
frustration with the state of the law, post-Rapanos.98 When one of the cases
he presided over had to be reheard in light of Rapanos, he refused to take
the case a second time, claiming he was “so perplexed by the way the law
applicable to this case has developed.”99
So far, the Supreme Court has refused to take up the issue again,
despite a request from both EPA and industry leaders.100 In 2008, the
Supreme Court turned down a government request to revisit Rapanos.101
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The Court’s refusal may be because the same splits remain, even though
there are two new Justices on the Court.102 The Court may also be waiting for the agencies to initiate a rulemaking.
2.

Past Attempts at Rulemaking and Guidance

Past attempts by EPA and Army Corps to clarify through rulemaking and guidance have failed to end the Rapanos confusion. In
January 2003, Army Corps and EPA issued an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and sought comments “on issues associated with
the scope of waters that are subject to the Clean Water Act in light of”
SWANCC.103 They received approximately 133,000 comments and 99%
were opposed to a new rule.104 Of the 43 states that commented, 41 voiced
concerns about any rollback in jurisdictional reach.105 In December 2003,
the Administration abandoned the rulemaking effort.106
Guidance is not legally binding on EPA or Army Corps.107 Guidance,
therefore, does not receive Chevron deference.108 Guidance was issued in
2008 and 2011, but it faced heavy criticism and has done little to clarify the
term “navigable waters.”109 The 2008 guidance allows a water to fall within
the scope of CWA jurisdiction if it meets either the Kennedy or plurality
test.110 The response to the guidance was overwhelmingly negative—some
stakeholders argued that it did not go far enough in protecting wetlands,
while others argued that it went too far.111 Most stakeholders did agree
that the guidance did not help with implementation of the “significant
nexus” test, which according to the guidance is used on a case-by-case
basis to decide which water bodies are “waters of the United States.”112
The latest attempt at revising guidance, issued in 2011, still faces
Congressional and industry criticism.113 The intent of the guidance was
to make the case-by-case analyses of “significant nexus” waters more
clear. Similar to the 2008 guidance, the revisions would adopt the
102
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Kennedy-test-or-plurality-test view, but it would expand upon the scope of
the previous guidance.114
The 2011 guidance expands upon the 2008 guidance because it
allows aggregation of streams and allows for watershed-wide aggregation
for similarly situated wetlands and tributaries.115 The 2011 guidance also
allows EPA and Army Corps to consider more factors when evaluating
whether there is a significant nexus, such as the existence of habitat that
provides a spawning area for downstream species.116
The main concerns of the critics of the proposed guidance revisions
were: (1) that it would broaden the scope of jurisdiction beyond what the
CWA and Supreme Court’s rulings permit; and (2) policy change through
guidance is non-binding and generally not reviewable by courts.117 A final
version of the 2011 guidance was never published. EPA submitted the 2011
final guidance to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in February 2012 and withdrew it in September 2013.118
D.

Past Legislative Failures

Some argue that Congressional action is needed to resolve the issue
of the scope of jurisdiction; however, Congressional attempts to solve the
issue have also failed. Upset with the confusion that emerged in the wake
of Rapanos, Congress wanted to clarify the issue and establish protection
for more of the nation’s waters by restoring the jurisdiction that existed
prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling.119 The Clean Water Restoration Act
was introduced in 2007 and again in 2009, where it was approved by the
Senate Environment and Public Works committee, but failed to go before
the Senate for a vote.120 The bill would have deleted “navigable waters”
from the CWA and defined “waters of the United States” using a rewritten
version of the regulatory definitions used by EPA and Army Corps.121
Instructions would also have been included to apply “waters of the United
States” consistent with how EPA and Army Corps applied it prior to
114
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SWANCC.122 The bill would have restored the broad jurisdiction and helped
eliminate the confusion that resulted from the Supreme Court’s meddling,
but industry and agriculture groups were strongly against the Act.123
At this time, there is no indication that Congress will undertake
similar legislation in the future since there are such strong, differing views
on the subject. Following the 111th Congress’s decision not to vote on the
Act, a similar bill was not reintroduced in the 112th Congress.124 In fact,
bills were introduced to: (1) block the ability of EPA and Army Corps to
issue revised guidance; and (2) narrow the definition of waters subject to
CWA jurisdiction.125 One challenge for legislatures is that the science behind the arguments for different scopes of jurisdiction is very complex and
it is difficult to draw a line.126
II.

EPA HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO USE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH TO
BROADEN ITS JURISDICTION AND CLARIFY THE DEFINITION OF
“WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”

EPA announced in September 2013 that it sent the Office of
Management and Budget a draft rule to clarify the uncertainty concerning
the jurisdiction of the CWA that has arisen as a result of recent Supreme
Court decisions.127 EPA hopes to provide clarity over which waters fall
within the scope of the CWA.128 The draft rule relies on a scientific report
entitled Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters,
which is a review and synthesis of more than 1,000 pieces of peer-reviewed
scientific literature.129 EPA should use the rulemaking process to restore
broad jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible within the confines of
the Supreme Court decisions.
Based on the scientific report, it is possible for the agencies to
argue for expanded jurisdiction over waters of the United States. The
draft study reaches three initial conclusions:
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(1) “[s]treams, regardless of their size or how frequently they
flow, are connected to and have important effects on downstream waters;” (2) “wetlands and open-waters in floodplains
of streams and rivers and in riparian areas are integrated
with streams and rivers;” and (3) there is insufficient information to determine the role isolated wetlands and openwaters [located outside of riparian areas and floodplains]
play in the connectivity of downstream waters.130
The first conclusion has some major implications and indicates
that federal jurisdiction may encompass all streams. The study concludes
that streams, both individually and cumulatively, have a “strong influence
on the character and functioning of downstream waters.”131 Additionally,
tributary streams “are physically, chemically, and biologically connected to
downstream rivers.”132 In Rapanos, the plurality test limited jurisdictional
waters to those with a relatively permanent flow that had a continuous
surface connection to a more traditional type of water.133 The draft study
appears to conclude that streams do not need either of those characteristics to impact the stated purposes of the CWA, “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”134
This conclusion provides an opportunity for EPA to expand the scope of
jurisdiction beyond the plurality test.
The second conclusion also provides an opportunity to expand
beyond the plurality test. Currently, a wetland needs a direct surface
water connection to a traditional water body in order to fall under CWA
jurisdiction.135 According to the study, wetlands and open waters in riparian areas and floodplains “are physically, chemically, and biologically
connected with rivers.”136 This conclusion provides the potential for the
agencies to create a clear test for regulating all wetlands that are located
in floodplains and riparian areas as “waters of the United States” and
would avoid the need for a “significant nexus,” case-by-case analysis. This
130
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is beneficial because it provides a “bright-line” test and has the potential
to increase the scope of jurisdiction beyond both Rapanos tests.
The third conclusion, dealing with unidirectional wetlands, including some ponds and lakes, concludes that more data needs to be
compiled and analyzed on these wetlands because the “type and degree
of connectivity varies” and “it is difficult to generalize about their effects
on downstream waters.”137 The study acknowledges that these wetlands
serve important functions, but more information is needed before EPA can
decide if it should expand jurisdiction to encompass these waters.138 It is
possible for more information to become available, and then the agencies
can make an informed decision. In the meantime, the agency can still
perform a case-by-case analysis for these wetlands.139
III.

RULEMAKING

A.

Benefits of Adopting a Rule

1.

Rulemaking Has Benefits over Guidance

Up to this point, EPA and Army Corps have issued guidance instead
of going through the rulemaking process. There are several reasons why
they have preferred guidance. Fewer procedures are necessary for guidance, making it less costly than rulemaking and less time consuming.140
In addition, it is possible for agencies to ensure some level of uniformity
and provide advance notice to the community regarding their interpretation of the law.141 Most importantly, it is a lot more difficult for individuals
to challenge policies developed through guidance in court or through administrative channels.142 While there are benefits to guidance, it is not
advisable for EPA and Army Corps to continue to rely on guidance.
Many of the features of guidance that have made it appealing over
the past decade have also created problems. One of the main benefits of
the rulemaking process is that it has the force of law.143 This would address one of the main criticisms of defining the scope of the CWA through
137
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guidance, which is that it is not legally binding. The rulemaking process
provides notice and the opportunity for public comment.144 Courts tend
to give rulemakings that follow the notice and comment procedure Chevron
deference, whereas guidance is not given the same deference.145 This is
important because the Supreme Court declined to apply Chevron deference in Rapanos.146 Chief Justice Roberts stressed that if Army Corps
had amended its regulatory definitions, the interpretation would have
been entitled to “generous” deference under Chevron since the statute
delegated the agency authority to define the scope of waters of the United
States.147 This is preferable to the Court, which has less scientific expertise, deciding the scope of the CWA on the few cases that come before it.
In addition, a final rule would be more difficult for a subsequent administration to undo because it requires more steps and has the force of law.
This will provide more stability to an area that has been heavily litigated
and plagued with uncertainty.
2.

A New Rule Could Provide Many Benefits to Industry
and Businesses

Almost immediately following EPA and Army Corps’s announcement of their draft joint rulemaking, industry groups started their attacks
on the rule.148 The National Federation of Independent Business sent a
letter claiming that the rule will have a significant economic impact on
small businesses and that EPA was therefore required to follow procedures under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”).149 Under its procedures, EPA must certify that the rule will not have a significant impact
on small businesses or publish a flexibility analysis.150 At the time of the
144
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attack, EPA had not made the rule available to the public, so the industry
challenge was premature.151
The early attack indicates that industry groups will strongly oppose any rule promulgated by EPA and Army Corps. Industry groups
should wait for more details about the rule to be released before challenging the rule. The rule will actually provide many benefits to industry
groups and businesses. By providing clarity and predictability as to which
waters fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA, a rule will reduce costs,
minimize delays, and protect the health of the nation’s waters.152 These
improvements will produce economic benefits to many of the nation’s
businesses and industries which rely on a reliable, abundant supply of
clean water.153 The proposed rule will also facilitate the ability of the
United States Department of Agriculture and CWA to work in tandem to
protect water quality and the environment by providing an incentive for
greater participation by farmers and ranchers in conservation programs.154
Industry actors will be more confident in their decisions because there
will be greater clarity over which waters are protected and require a
permit. This will also reduce costs associated with litigation, which has
been very prevalent on this issue.
The proposed rule will likely not be a barrier to economic growth.
An economic analysis of the possible impacts of past guidance found that
while more wetlands would be covered by the permitting program, leading
to some additional costs, the benefits to the public would substantially
outweigh the costs.155 One estimate lists the potential costs in the range
of $63 to $185 million while the potential benefits range from $162 to
$368 million.156 In addition, the agencies are not proposing “changes to
existing regulatory exemptions and exclusions, including those that
apply to the agricultural sector that ensure the continuing production of
food, fiber and fuel to the benefit of all Americans.”157 Therefore, industry
151
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should not be so quick to oppose the rulemaking process because a new
rule may provide them many benefits.
3.

Benefits for Environment and Wildlife Recreation

Wetlands and the nation’s waters serve many vital functions.
Wetlands provide essential habitats for fish, shellfish, plant life, waterfowl, and other wildlife.158 The estimated value of wetlands habitats to
the global economy is about $15 trillion.159 It is estimated that wetlands
save the United States at least $30 billion in flood damage repair costs.160
Wetlands provide flood and storm drainage protection, erosion control,
water supply, and groundwater recharge.161 Wetlands also provide a source
for trapping, hunting, harvesting timber, fish, and shellfish, and energy
production from peat.162
In addition, wetlands improve water quality by removing nutrients,
producing oxygen, filtering sediments, and processing chemical and organic
wastes.163 Past guidance was expected to protect “streams and wetlands
that support fishing and hunting, filter sediment and contaminants, reduce
flooding, and contribute to drinking water supplies.”164 It is estimated that
117 million Americans get their drinking water from sources fed by waters
that fall within the scope of jurisdictional uncertainty.165
After the SWANCC decision, environmental groups were concerned
about the ecological ramifications.166 Almost half of all U.S. wetlands are
“isolated” and the ecological and pollution control functions that isolated
wetlands perform are indistinguishable from those performed by adjacent
wetlands.167 One of the issues with the past guidance is that it incorporates the plurality opinion’s presumption against jurisdiction for most
common types of waters in the country, intermittent and ephemeral
tributaries. To overcome the presumption, a “significant nexus” needs
158
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to be established, and this requires a significant amount of time and resources. According to an Army Corps official, a “significant nexus” analysis
of jurisdiction is eight to ten times more resource-intensive.168 The caseby-case analysis leads to delays in the permitting process and limits the
number of investigations and enforcement actions that can take place.169
Increasing the scope of the waters covered would allow EPA to avoid this
case-by-case analysis for some of these wetlands, and will lead to more
enforcement to protect the nation’s valuable wetlands.
EPA prepared an economic analysis to accompany the 2011
guidance. The report estimated that the majority of cost increases would
result from incremental permitting costs and mitigation expenses to the
actors seeking section 404 permits.170 However, the benefits would range
from $162 million to $328 million annually, while the cost would range
from $87 million to $171 million.171 The benefits would result from water
quality improvements.172
B.

A Rule Based on the Scientific Study Does Not Unlawfully
Expand CWA Jurisdiction

Congress intended for the term “navigable waters” to be given the
broadest possible interpretation.173 In addition, there is Supreme Court
precedent supporting CWA jurisdiction over interstate waters without
respect to navigability.174 In City of Milwaukee, the Court reasoned that
if the CWA protections only applied to navigable interstate waters, then
downstream states would not be able to protect many of their waters
from out-of-state pollution.175 The CWA would not be a comprehensive
regulatory scheme if it left so many waters unprotected.176 In addition,
the Supreme Court’s decisions in SWANCC and Rapanos do not limit or
constrain CWA jurisdiction over non-navigable interstate waters.177 It is
constitutional for the agencies to regulate interstate wetlands that fall
within the boundaries outlined by the scientific studies.178
168
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The proposed rule is not trying to unconstitutionally expand power,
but is simply trying to restore jurisdiction to the original scope intended by
Congress. According to EPA, the proposed rule is being promulgated to
clarify the current uncertainty surrounding the jurisdiction of the CWA
that has arisen out of recent Supreme Court cases.179 The Supreme Court
cases indicated that smaller waters needed some connection to larger
waters in order to fall within the scope of the CWA.180 EPA and Army
Corps are focusing on clarifying protection of the network of smaller
waters that feed into larger ones, to keep downstream water safe from
upstream pollutants.181 The agencies are also trying to protect “wetlands
that filter and trap pollution, store water, and help keep communities
safe from floods.”182 The agencies stress that they are not attempting to
change existing regulatory exemptions and exclusions.183
The new rule would classify all streams, wetlands in riparian
areas and floodplains, and open waters in riparian areas and floodplains
as waters that are within the agencies’ jurisdiction under “waters of the
United States.”184 For unidirectional wetlands, more information is
needed on the effects of these wetlands on downstream waters. If promulgated, this rule would be consistent with the plurality and concurring
opinions in Rapanos.
The rule encompasses the plurality test because waters that (1) are
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters and (2) have a continuous surface
connection to those waters fall under CWA jurisdiction.185 It is important
to note that all streams would likely be protected because this fills in a
gap that exists when only the “significant nexus” test is used.186 The rule
also includes waters that satisfy the “significant nexus” test, thereby
leading to a broad scope of jurisdiction. The scientific reports give the
agencies the data they need to support the inclusion of smaller waters
within the scope of the CWA. For isolated wetlands where more research
179
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needs to be conducted on their impact on downstream waters, the agencies
can perform a case-by-case “significant nexus” analysis. The new rule
broadens the scope of the CWA jurisdiction to include protections that
are similar to those invalidated by Rapanos, but the agencies now have
the scientific data to meet the criteria established by the two tests, and
it is likely that a majority of the Justices will uphold this rule.
C.

Rulemaking Is a Necessary Step That Needs to Happen Now

Many different stakeholders, including members of Congress,
state and local officials, industry, agriculture, environmental groups, and
the public have requested that EPA undertake a rulemaking process.187
After years of inadequate guidance following SWANCC and Rapanos, it is
apparent that clarification is necessary. The Rapanos opinions of Kennedy,
Breyer, and Roberts encourage a rulemaking to clarify what constitutes
a “water of the United States.” The Supreme Court has declined to take
up the issue again, and Congress is not providing a legislative solution.
According to a March 2008 EPA memorandum, the permitting process has been severely impacted since Rapanos was decided.188 Approximately 500 enforcement cases (a significant portion of the total) were
negatively affected by the ruling and subsequent guidance.189 Between
July 2006 and December 2007, EPA decided not to pursue enforcement
of more than 300 CWA violations because of jurisdictional uncertainty.190
In an additional 147 cases, the priority of enforcement was lowered because of uncertainty about whether the waters were within the scope of
the CWA.191 Of the cases negatively affected, EPA decided not to move
forward with enforcement due to jurisdictional uncertainty.192
After the SWANCC and Rapanos rulings, polluters asserted that
many waters were not within the scope of the CWA, leaving many streams,
creeks, and isolated wetlands vulnerable to contamination.193 A 2008
187
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investigation by the House Oversight and Transportation Committees
concluded that drastic deterioration in EPA’s enforcement program was
directly attributable to the Rapanos decision and subsequent guidance.194
EPA regulators estimated that more than 1500 major pollution investigations were discontinued or put on hold between 2006 and 2010.195 It
is clear that EPA is having difficulty protecting the nation’s waters, and
that litigation is likely whenever EPA pursues enforcement. It is imperative that a rule broadening and clarifying the scope of CWA jurisdiction
is promulgated as soon as possible.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, Congress would pass legislation to clarify the scope of the
CWA post-Rapanos. However, the political climate is not conducive to
Congressional action, and the confusion surrounding which waters are
protected has lasted long enough. In order to protect our nation’s waters,
EPA and Army Corps need to promulgate a rule that is consistent with
recent Supreme Court rulings, using the latest scientific findings. The
scientific findings support a broad interpretation of the scope of the CWA
because streams and most wetlands are adjacent to navigable waters,
have a surface connection to navigable waters, or have a “significant
nexus” to navigable waterways downstream. Protecting these waters will
provide benefits to the public, industry, and wetlands. A rule based on
this scientific data should receive generous deference, which the Court
declined to grant in Rapanos.
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